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Welch: Welch: No Notice Is Good News

No Notice Is Good News: Notice
Under the New Ombuds Standards for
the Establishment and Operation of
Ombuds Offices
I. INTRODUCTION

The American Bar Association (ABA) recently announced its decision to endorse the revised Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices, dated February 2004.1 A modification to the 2001 Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices, 2 the new Standards are responsible
for certain clarifications of the role of an ombuds. One such clarification is that of
notice in the employment context. Under the new Standards, communications
made to an ombuds regarding complaints of violations or unlawful practices
within the workplace do not constitute notice to the employer, provided that the
ombud's practices are consistent with the core qualities an ombud's office must
possess under the Standards. As the 2001 Standards did not address the issue of
notice, the new notice provision is particularly important. Because numerous
employment dispute proceedings throughout the past few decades have resulted in
a judicial finding that an employer received constructive notice of some
discriminatory action or other violation within the workplace, the new notice
provision is a significant development in the area of employment disputes. The
benefits of the new provision will likely extend to both ombuds in the workplace
and the entities for which such ombuds work. This Comment explores the
backdrop against which notice in the employment context has traditionally been
considered, and examines both the rationale employed in forming the new notice
provision and the future implications of the provision in the employment context.
1. American Bar Association, Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice, Section of
Business Law, Section of Dispute Resolution, Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities, Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices (2004), at http://www.abanet.org/leader
ship/2004/recommendations/1 15.pdf [hereinafter ABA, Revised Standards 20041. The establishment
of the new Standards is preceded by years of ABA support for increasing the use of ombuds in a
broader range of entities. In 1969:
[The ABA] adopted a resolution ...recommending that state and local governments consider establishing ombudsmen who would be authorized to inquire into administrative action and to
make public criticism. [The ABA adopted a second resolution in 1971], recommending that the
[flederal government experiment with the establishment of ombudsmen for certain geographical
areas, specific agencies, or for limited phases of [flederal activities. In 2001, [the ABA] adopted
[another] resolution supporting the greater use of "ombuds" [in handling claims] involving [both]
public and private entities.
ABA, Report on Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices 1 (2004) [hereinafter ABA, Report 2004]. The 2001 Resolution also endorsed Standards for the Establishment and
Operations of Ombuds Offices and, together, the 2001 Resolution and Standards broadened the ABA's
existing policy at that time to address the growing role of ombuds in both the private and public sectors. Id.
2. ABA, Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices (2001), at http://www.
abanet.org/poladvletters/107th/adminlawo72602/attach.pdf [hereinafter ABA, Standards2001].
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The New Ombuds Standards
The new Standards are a modification of the 2001 Standards for the Establishment and Operations of Ombuds Offices, 3 and were developed in response to
the proliferation of divergent processes utilized by various ombuds offices, and
the resulting inconsistent expectations of individuals seeking assistance from
those offices.4 Propelled by the concern that, as a result of this inconsistency,
ombuds offices may be established in ways that would compromise their effectiveness, the Standards were developed to provide advice and guidance on the
structure and operation of ombuds offices, so that ombuds may better fulfill their
functions and so that "individuals [may] avail themselves of [an ombuds'] aid...
with greater confidence in the integrity of the process."5
B. Ombuds Generally
An ombuds is an individual who "receive[s) complaints and questions from6
individuals concerning people within an entity or the functioning of an entity."
The role of ombuds was originated in Scandinavian countries and now has worldwide recognition for its dispute resolution efficiency.7 The first United States
government ombuds office was established in New York in 1966, and the first
state to establish an ombuds office was Hawaii in 1967. 8 Today, such ombuds
offices are found throughout the country. 9
"The first ombuds offices operated within a governmental framework in what
is now known as the classical ombudsman model."' Classical ombuds offices
were "legally established by one or more branches of government, but maintained
independence from all branches of government" in its dispute resolution processes. " Today, ombuds continue to "work for the resolution of particular issues

3. Id.
4. Id. at 1.
5. ABA, Standards 2001, supra note 2, at 1. To ensure that ombuds can protect individual rights
against the excesses of public and private bureaucracies, the Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice, Business Law, Dispute Resolution, and Individual Rights & Responsibilities sections have
worked together with the ombuds community and with other ABA entities to develop a resolution to
support amendments to the Standards. See ABA, Report 2004, supranote 1, at 2.
6. ABA, Revised Standards 2004, supra note 1, at 2. As stated in both the Standards and the
Report, the term "ombuds," as it is used in this summary, is intended to encompass all other forms of
the work such as ombudsperson, ombuds officers, and ombudsman, a Swedish word meaning "agent"
or "representative." See ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, at 1 n.I. The use of "ombuds" in both the
Standards and the Report "is not intended to discourage others from using other terms." Id.
7. DOUGLAS H. YARN, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
GEORGIA § 10-31 (2d ed. 1997).

8.
9.
many
10.
11.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN

Id. The ombuds office was called a "public protector." Id.
Id. While many ombuds "retain all of the characteristics of the classical ombudsmen model...
have adapted the role to changing circumstances." Id.
Id.
Id.
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and, where appropriate, make recommendations
' 2 for the improvement of the general administration of the entities they serve."'
The ombuds capacity in the employment context is found in the form of an
"organizational ombuds."' 13 An "organizational ombuds" may be found in the
public or private sector and "ordinarily addresses problems presented by mem-14
bers, employees, or contractors of an entity concerning its actions or policies."
This person "facilitates fair and equitable resolutions of concerns" arising within
the establishing entity. An organizational ombuds should be "authorized to undertake inquiries and function by informal processes as specified by [the organization's] charter."' 6 This person should also be "authorized to conduct independent
and impartial inquiries" within her designated jurisdiction and to further have the
authority to issue reports and advocate for change.17 To fulfill the numerous duties included in the role of an organizational ombuds, the ombuds must have frequent communication with the entity in which it acts, as well as with the employees who make complaints to the ombuds office.' 8 As such, the issue of what level
of protection should be afforded such communications has been the subject of
much recent deliberation within the alternative dispute resolution community.
C. Notice in the Employment Context
The issue of notice has pervaded labor and employment cases for decades.
Notice questions arise frequently in cases in which an employee is the alleged
victim of some violation or unfair practice performed by either the employer or by
another employee or supervisor. Many such employment actions involve harassment claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as implemented by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).' 9 The relevant section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), sets forth unlawful employment practices, delineates various types of discrimination, and provides for the statute's enforcement.20
Many actions involving employee allegations of harassment do not involve
the issue of notice at all. For instance, in the influential United States Supreme

12. ABA, Revised Standards 2004, supra note 1, at 2. The ABA has categorized the interests protected by ombuds: "(1) the legitimate interests and rights of individuals with respect to each other; (2)
individual rights against the excesses of public and private bureaucracies; and (3) those who are affected by and those who work within these organizations." Id.
13. Id. 1 I. Other types of ombuds include legislative ombuds, organizational ombuds, and advocate
ombuds. ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, at 2.
14. ABA, Revised Standards2004, supranote 1, at 1.
15. Id. 11.
16. Id. I.
17. Id. 11
18. The executive ombuds: "(1) should be authorized to conduct investigations and inquiries; (2)
should be authorized to issue reports on the results of such investigations and inquiries; and, (3) if
located in government, should not have general jurisdiction over more than one agency, but may have
jurisdiction over [a] subject matter that involves multiple agencies." Id. H.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2004). See also Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, When is Supervisor's
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 Imputable to
Employer, 157 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2004).
20. Binimow, supra note 19, at 1. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2004).
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Court case Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,2t the plaintiff sued her employer under
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), alleging sexual harassment by her supervisor. 22 In its discussion, the Supreme Court considered the class of cases in which a supervisor takes
a "tangible employment action against a subordinate," such as a discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. 23 The Court stated that "[e]very [federal circuit] to have considered the question has found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action." 24 Courts have also held
that if a plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury from her supervi25
sor's actions, her employer becomes strictly liable without any further showing.
Under these circumstances, an employer is strictly liable, and notice is of no relevance to a court's determination of liability.
The cases in which the issue of notice does arise, however, are those cases not
involving strict liability. The courts deciding these actions place great importance
on an employer's knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the alleged discriminatory practice or violation in determining whether the employer is liable for
such alleged discrimination. The EEOC provides that "[w]ith respect to conduct
between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer, [its agents, or supervisory employees]
knows or should have known of the conduct, unless [the employer] can show that
it took immediate and appropriate corrective action. 2 6 The Ellerth court, for
instance, in applying this rule to the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim, stated that
"[a]n employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should
have known about the alleged conduct and failed to stop it.' ' 27 Ellerth, and many

cases succeeding it, have applied this rule in finding that an employer is subject to
liability with respect to a harassment claim even if it had no actual knowledge of
the alleged
conduct, so long as the employer should have known about the alleged
28
conduct.
The issue with which courts struggle in employment actions is the determination of what actions or circumstances are sufficient to show that an employer
should have known about discriminatory conduct. In other words, courts must
determine what actions constitute "constructive notice" and, in turn, when notice
should be imputed to an employer. Many courts have recognized that "the type
21. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 760-61.
24. Id. at 760. See also Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) (stating "courts
have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory
personnel, whether or not the employer knew or should have known, or approved of the supervisor's
actions").
25. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992)).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2004). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (2004); Jacob-Mua v. Veneman,
289 F.3d 517, 522-23 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that "to establish a prima facie case of hostile work
environment harassment by non-supervisory co-workers, [plaintiff] must establish, [among other
elements, that] the employer knew or should have known of harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action").
27. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998). According to the Restatement, under
these circumstances, the employer is subject to liability for its negligence or recklessness.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 219 (1958).

28. Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 202 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000); Kunin v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 175 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 1999).
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and extent of notice necessary to impose liability on an employer under Title VII
is the subject of some uncertainty. ' 2 9 Determinations of employer notice frequently must be made in cases in which the plaintiff presents evidence that she
reported incidents of harassment or other discriminatory acts to a supervisor also
working for the employer. In these cases, many courts look to whether the employer had any policy in place that obligated the supervisor to relay such information to the employer.30
In Williamson v. City of Houston, the Fifth Circuit stated that because a police
department policy gave a supervisor the authority to accept harassment complaints, the supervisor's knowledge of the plaintiff's complaints of sexual harassment could be imputed to the police department for purposes of liability, even
though the police officer had not chosen to exercise that authority by relaying the
information. 3' In addition, the Seventh Circuit has held that an employer may be
"notified" of a sexual harassment claim if the information regarding the alleged
conduct meets particular criteria:
[The claim] must either (1) come to the attention of someone who (a) has
under the terms of his employment, or (b) is reasonably believed to have,
or (c) is reasonably charged by law with having, a duty to pass on the information to someone within the company who has the power to do
something about it; or, (2) come to the attention of such a someone. 32
Many courts take into consideration an employer's organizational structure
and/or size in determining whether a complaint made by an employee to someone
other than the employer suffices as notice to the employer. In Miller v. Kenworth
of Dothan, Inc.,33 the plaintiff presented evidence showing that one of only two
managers permanently assigned to the plaintiff's employer had received notice of
harassment directed against the plaintiff. 34 After pointing out that only one other
employee separated the manager from the employer's president, the Eleventh
Circuit held that this organizational structure, combined with the fact that the
manager was one of only two managers on-site at the employment site, would
allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the manager was of a sufficiently high

29. Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Farpella-Crosby v.
Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 807 (5th Cir. 1996)).
30. See id. at 466 (focusing on whether the supervisor was authorized to accept complaints of harassment).
31. Id. But see Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
"when an employer has promulgated an effective and comprehensive anti-harassment policy that is
aggressively and thoroughly disseminated to its employees, an employee's failure to utilize the policy's grievance process will prevent constructive knowledge of such harassment from adhering to the
employer").
32. Young v. Bayer Corp., 123 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625,
638 (2d Cir. 1997)) (holding that an employer had notice where complainant notified her department
head, one of four options for reporting complaints described in company's harassment policy).
33. 277 F.3d 1269 (11 th Cir. 2002).
34. Id. at 1279.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2005, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 13

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. I

level in the company that notice
to him of the hostile work environment would
35
serve as notice to the employer.
D. Ombuds and Notice
Key to the ombuds process is the protection afforded to communications that
are made to an ombuds by a complainant. 36 Many courts have asserted that without confidentiality, the ombuds process would not work. Numerous courts have
differed, however, on the extent to which confidentiality protects communications.
Actions that involve analysis of ombuds confidentiality often turn on the issue of
whether communications to an ombuds are entitled to a qualified privilege for
discovery purposes.
The California Court of Appeal's case Garstang v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,37 is commonly cited for the proposition that communications disclosed
during a mediation session before an ombuds are protected by a qualified privilege.38 In Garstang,the plaintiff filed a claim for slander against her employer,39
the California Institute of Technology, and three of her co-employees, alleging
that the co-employees had made false statements to third persons that the plaintiff
had "traded sexual favors for job advancement." 40 Before trial, the plaintiff
moved to compel further responses from the defendants, regarding statements
made by the defendants during a pre-trial mediation over which an ombuds had
presided. 41 The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that because the communications made during the mediation were made before an ombuds, they were
privileged pursuant to the California constitutional right to privacy. 42 In its analysis of the qualified privileged claim, the California Court of Appeal conceded that
denying the plaintiff the opportunity to depose the defendants as to what was said
during the meetings with the ombudsman
would impair her ability to ascertain the
43
truth in connection with her lawsuit.
Its analysis notwithstanding, the Garstang court determined that a proper balancing of competing values weighed in favor of the right to privacy of those individuals participating in the ombuds sessions, because the communications made
during the session related to the private affairs of various company employees and
were maintained in confidence by the institution. 44 In its analysis, the court

35. Id. But see Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"actual notice of racial discrimination to two Wal-Mart store managers could not serve as notice to the
corporation because [the managers] were not sufficiently high up the corporate ladder").
36. ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § C(3) (calling confidentiality an "essential characteristic").
37. 39 Cal. App. 4th 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (basing the privilege on the state constitutional right
to privacy).
38. Id. at 532. But see Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that record is not sufficient for court to create wholly new evidentiary privilege).
39. Garstang, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 529-30. The plaintiffs complaint also included a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
40. Id. at 530.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 533.
44. Id. at 533-34.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss1/13

6

Welch: Welch: No Notice Is Good News

20051

Ombuds Standards

looked to the 1991 federal case, Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,45 which
held that:
[C]ommunications received during an informal mediation before an ombudsman were privileged because the communication was made in the
belief that it would not be disclosed, [because] confidentiality was essential to the maintenance of the relationship between the parties, [because]
the relationship was one that society considers worthy of being fostered,
and [because] the injury to the relationship incurred by disclosure would
be greater than the benefit gained in the correct disposal of litigation.46
In its discussion, the court stated, "There is no question that confidentiality is
essential to the maintenance of the relationship between [the institute's] employees and management., 47 The court continued:
The function of an [ombuds] office is to receive communications and to
remedy workplace problems, in a strictly confidential atmosphere. Without this confidentiality, the office would be just one more nonconfidential opportunity for employees to air disputes. The [ombuds] office provides an opportunity for complete disclosure, without the specter
of retaliation, that does not exist in the other available, non-confidential
grievance and complaint procedures.48
The Garstang court noted that it was "readily apparent" that the relationship
between the ombuds office and the company's employees and management was
worthy of societal support.49 Specifically, it was important that the institute's
students and employees had "'an opportunity to make confidential statements and
to receive confidential guidance, information, and aid to remedy workplace problems' to benefit themselves and their community." 50 Further, it was apparent to
the court that the "harm caused by the disruption of the confidential relationship
between the ombuds office and others in [the plaintiffs] case would be greater
than the benefit to [the plaintiff] by disclosure." 5' "A successful ombudsman
program resolves many problems informally and more quickly than other more
formal procedures, including court actions. '52 The court noted that the utility of
45. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. 570 (D. Mo. 1991), overruled by Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114
F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1997).
46. Garstang v. Super. Ct. of L.A., 39 Cal. App. 4th 526, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). The Garstang
court noted that Kientzy was decided in the federal system which, "unlike California, permits the
judicial creation of privileges." Id. The Court explained that it found the reasoning useful, however,
in considering whether, and under what circumstances, a qualified privilege should be extended to
communications made before an ombudsman. Id. See also Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90, 92 (D.
Iowa 1987) (asserting that if state officials become less candid when contacted by an ombudsman out
of fear that any admission might be used against them in a subsequent legal action, the power of the
ombuds office to solve problems will diminish).
47. Garstang, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 535.
48. Id. (quoting Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572).
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572).
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572).
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an ombuds program and office "in resolving disputes in the workplace and thus
diminishing the need for more formal resolution procedures, is founded on the
confidentiality of its communications to and from company officials and employees." 53 Accordingly, the court determined, an order that those participating in the
sessions held by an ombuds must disclose information communicated in confidence, would "destroy the reputation and principle of confidentiality" that the
institute's ombuds program needs to perform its function.54 The court went on to
advocate that the privacy interests of individuals participating in an ombuds pro55
gram such as the institute's should be afforded constitutional protection.
Although the holdings of many state court cases are consistent with that of
Garstang, many federal courts that have dealt with the issue of an ombuds privilege have reached conflicting conclusions. Some federal courts have found that
that no such privilege should necessarily be afforded communications to an om5
buds.56 The Eighth Circuit case, Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., for instance, overruled Kientzy, holding that in order "[t]o justify the creation of a privilege, [the defendant] must first establish that society benefits in some significant
58
Beway from the particular brand of confidentiality that the privilege affords.,
cause the Carmancourt found that the record of the case at hand did not meet this
standard, it held that confidential communications made by an employee to a
company ombuds who investigated and mediated workplace disputes were not
59
Co.,60
privileged from disclosure. In another case, Solorzano v. Shell Chemical
the Louisiana Eastern District Court found that the issue of whether the public
interests would be served by an ombuds' privilege in federal cases required a
"weighing of interests more appropriate for the Congress than the courts."
E. The Standardson Notice
One important aspect of the new Standards is its clarification that communications made by an individual to an ombuds do not necessarily constitute notice to
the ombuds establishing entity. 61 In the employer-employee context, the issue of
53. Id. (quoting Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 572).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 535.
56. See Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1997). See also Solorzano v.
Shell Chem. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12072, at *15 (E.D. La. 2000). Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act contain no privilege for ombudsmen's records.
57. 114 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1997).
58. Id. at 794.
59. Id. In reaching its decision on whether to create a new evidentiary privilege, the Carman court
assessed "the importance of the relationship that the privilege [would] foster." Id. at 793. The court
found that the defendant had failed to present evidence that the ombuds method was more successful at
resolving workplace disputes than other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Id. The court also
pointed out that, "Even without a privilege, corporate ombudsmen still have much to offer employees
in the way of confidentiality [because] they are still able to promise to keep employee communications
confidential from management." Id. at 793-94. See also Solorzano v. Shell Chem. Co., 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12072, at *17-18 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 2000) (holding that defendant in age discrimination
case was not entitled to a protective order for the ombudsman program records because the records
were not privileged under federal common law or state statute and the court declined to find a new
privilege).
60. Solorzano, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12072, at *15.
61. ABA, Revised Standards2004, supra note 1, 1 F.
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notice arises when an employee makes a work-related complaint to an ombuds
acting for her employer. The Standards recognize that when meeting with an
ombuds, employees "discuss allegations of unfairness, poor administration, abuse
of power, and other sensitive subjects. 62 As a result, an employee "may fear
personal, professional, or economic retaliation, [as well as] loss of privacy and
loss of relationships."63 The 2004 Report states, "Many employees faced with
sexual or racial harassment, for example, may quit, become ill, or suffer in silence." 64 For these reasons, the writers of the new Standards have determined that
such communications must be protected if employees "are to be willing to visit
and speak candidly with [an] ombuds.,, 65 As a modification to the 2001 Standards, the issue of notice under the new Standards will likely have a strong impact
on the entire ombuds process in the workplace.
Under the Standards, employers that establish an ombuds should authorize the
ombuds to operate with confidentiality and independence. 66 In order to maintain
confidentiality under the Standards' definition, the ombuds must not disclose and
must not be required to disclose the identity of a complainant without the complainant's express consent. 67 However, there is an exception for disclosures necessary to address imminent risk of serious harm. 68 Specifically, the ombuds must
69
not reveal the identity of a complainant without that person's express consent.
In order to be independent, the ombuds must be free from interference in the performance of her duties and must be independent from control, limitation, or penalty imposed for retaliatory purposes by the ombuds' employer or by a person
who may be the subject of a complaint or inquiry. 70 Accordingly, the ombuds
should inform anyone who contacts the ombuds office that she will not voluntarily
disclose to anyone outside the office any information the employee provided in
confidence, nor the identity of the employee, unless the employee consents to such
disclosure. 7'
The new Standards, confronting the issue of notice, are based on the principle
that "an ombuds is intended to supplement, and not replace, formal procedures. 72
Thus, a "person contacting an ombuds for assistance needs to understand the difference between working with an ombuds and seeking formal redress. '73 The new
62. ABA, Report 2004, supranote 1, § F.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. § C(3). Confidentiality extends to all communications with the ombuds and to all notes and
records maintained by the ombuds in the performance of assigned duties. Id.
69. Id. § C.
70. Id. § C(l).
71. Id. § C(3). The exception to the general rule of non-disclosure is that disclosure may be made if
necessary to address the imminent risk of serious harm. Id. The new Standards also recognize that in
some limited circumstances an ombuds may be compelled by a court to divulge confidential information. Id. §§ C, F.
72. Id. § F.
73. Id. § F. The ombuds should inform an individual contacting him or her that working with the
ombuds may address the problem or concern effectively, but may not protect the rights of either the
person contacting the office or the entity in which the ombuds operates. Id. The Standards allow the
ombuds to inform people coming to the ombuds office of the issues identified in the Standards via "a
brochure or [website]." The brochure or website must explain the function of the office, or the om-
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notice Standards are designed to ensure that an employee who goes to her employer's ombuds office will be aware that she may need to take further action by
talking to a lawyer or to another appropriate resource about the protection of any
legal rights that might be at stake.74 The Standards acknowledge that when formal
action is initiated against an employer, the plaintiff-employee's rights may be
affected by whether and when the employer was notified of its allegedly inappropriate or wrongful conduct.75 In the event that an employee wishes to bring an
action against her employer regarding a work-related problem or violation, the
fact that the employee has talked to an ombuds does not change the notice requirement or the specific time by which the employee's action must be commenced. 76 Thus, an ombuds must inform the complaining employee that her
communications to the ombuds may not constitute notice to the employer.77
Obviously, an ombuds may often need to work with an employer or representatives of the employer in addressing a work-related complaint. 78 If, in this case,
the ombuds communicates with representatives of the employer79 concerning an
alleged violation, and reveals both the identity of the complainant and the specific
allegation, then the communication should be regarded as providing notice of the
alleged violation to the employer, and the ombuds should inform the complainant
that the employer was notified. 80 Likewise, "if the ombuds communicates [identical or very similar] allegations of multiple complainants that may reflect related
behavior.., that is either inappropriate or wrongful" the employer should also be
regarded as having notice of the alleged violation. 81 It is also possible for the
ombuds to provide enough information that the employer is in fact put on notice,
even if confidentiality is maintained.82 The new Standards provide that whether
is
the complainant's communication to the ombuds constitutes notice to the entity
83
a fact question that should be determined by analyzing the communications.
The notice provisions under the new Standards result from the idea that the
Standards do not contemplate an ombuds providing any sort of legal advice as to
what an individual's legal rights are, but rather, as providing information on

buds' establishing entity may include similar information in a manual, other information provided to
affected people, or as part of the charter for the ombuds office. Id. § F.
74. Id. § F.
75. ABA, Revised Standards2004, supra note 1, at 5.
76. ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § F(l).
77. Id.
78. Id. § F. Any such communications are subject to the confidentiality provisions in § C of the new
Standards. Id.
79. ABA, Revised Standards 2004, supra note 1, 1 F. Under these standards, any such communication is subject to the Standards discussion of limitations on ombuds' authority. Id. at 5 n.7.
80. Id. at 5-6.
81. Id. In the instance of multiple complainants, the fact that there are multiple complainants makes
up for the lack of a specific identity. Id. "In both instances, the information provided would need to
be sufficiently detailed that the entity could conduct its own investigation with respect to the allegations." ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § F.
82. ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § F.
83. Id. The ombuds must also make clear that working with him or her may address an individual's
problem effectively, but may not protect the rights of either the individual or the entity in which the
ombuds operates. Id. An ombuds must inform an individual seeking her help that the ombuds is not,
and is not a substitute for, anyone's lawyer, representative, or counselor. Id. Thus, the individual may
wish to consult a lawyer or other appropriate resource with respect to her legal rights. Id.
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whether those rights exist. 84 If an ombuds functions in accordance with the core
qualities of independence, impartiality, and confidentiality, 85 then no one, including the entity in which the ombuds operates, should deem the ombuds to be an
agent of any person or entity, other than the office of the ombuds, for purposes of
receiving notice of the establishing entity's alleged violations or unlawful practices.86 Moreover, communications made to the ombuds should not be imputed to
anyone else, including the entity, unless the ombuds communicates with entity
representatives as previously discussed.87 Because the ombuds is independent of
the employer in this respect, it would be inappropriate for the ombuds to accept
notice on its behalf with respect to any alleged grievance.88
F. Modification of the 2001 Standards Provision
The 2001 Standards did not address the issue of whether such communications constitute notice, stating only that "important legal rights and liabilities may
be affected by the notice issue., 89 The ABA Report that accompanied the 2001
Standards, however, discussed the issue at length. 90 The 2001 Report pointed out
that, if an ombuds functioned in accordance with the Standards by operating with
confidentiality and independence, it could be strongly argued that the establishing
entity's management lacked the control over day to day operations that are essential for someone to be deemed an agent. 91 Thus, there was strong support for the
idea that any communication to the ombuds should not be imputed to any other
person, including the entity. 92 Accordingly, "it would not be appropriate for the
ombuds to accept notice on the entity's behalf with respect to an alleged grievance." 93 The 2001 Report also stated that some ombuds offices already instituted
outside the framework of the 2001 Standards did not operate with confidentiality
or independence.94 In some cases, management's control over an ombuds may be
so extensive as to substantially weaken the argument that the office could not be
deemed to be an agent of management. 95 Following this reasoning, a strong argument could also be made that knowledge of a communication to the ombuds
should be imputed to management. 96 The 2001 Report concluded by stating that
because the law in this area was continuing to evolve, it was unclear what a court
might decide with regard to notice in the wide range of circumstances that may

84. ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § F.
85. ABA, Revised Standards 2004, supra note 1, at 6.
86. Id. Rather, the ombuds would be deemed independent of the entity itself for these purposes.
ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § F.

87. ABA, Revised Standards2004, supra note 1, at 6.
88. ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § F.
89. ABA, Standards 2001, supra note 2, § F.
90. ABA, Report on Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices (2001)
[hereinafter ABA, Report 2001].
91. Id.§F.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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arise.97 Based upon these conflicting rationales and uncertainty regarding the
notice issue, the 2001 Standards did not address the issue. 98
Ill. COMMENT
A. The New Standardsas Compared to the 2001 Standards
Since the 2001 Standards did not address the issue of notice, the notice provision contained in the 2004 Standards is a great modification to the 2001 Standards. And although a notice provision was not provided in the 2001 Standards,
the 2001 Report's discussion of the notice issue is clearly reflected in the new
Standards. By acknowledging that an establishing entity should authorize an ombuds to operate with confidentiality and independence, 99 and by recognizing that
by operating with such qualities a strong argument can be made for the proposition that management lacks the control that is essential for an ombuds to be
deemed an agent, 1°° the analysis contained in the 2001 Report was undoubtedly
fundamental in the development of the new notice provision.
On the other hand, the 2001 Report also presents an argument that communications to an ombuds should be imputed to management. As the 2001 Standards
point out, there are some cases in which management's control over an ombuds
may be so extensive that it substantially weakens the argument that the ombuds
office cannot be deemed to be an agent of management.' 01 Indeed, the 2004 Standards and Report provide for instances in which the ombuds's entity should be
regarded as having notice. 0 2 Where the ombuds' communication to the entity
"reveals the facts of a specific allegation and the identity of the complainant," for
instance, the entity is deemed to have notice.1 0 3 Still, the extent of management's
everyday control over an ombuds is of little relevance when examined in light of
the 2004 Standards because the purpose of the new notice provision is to set an
unambiguous standard by which a complainant's communication to an ombuds
may be considered. Under the new Standards, an ombuds must inform a complainant that, unless the ombuds contacts the entity as specifically described in the
Standards, the communications will not constitute notice to the entity.104
Also key to the 2004 notice provision is the emphasis on the concept that an
ombuds is intended to supplement, and not replace, formal procedures. 105 This is
supported by the language of the 2004 Standards, which provides that an ombuds
should explain to her complainants that "working with the ombuds is an informal
97. Id.
98. Id. The 2001 Report stated, however, that important legal rights and liabilities may be affected
by the resolution of the notice issue and that an ombuds should, in appropriate circumstances, advise
an individual that, unless the individual authorizes the ombuds to inform an entity's management about
a matter, the entity may not be deemed to have notice of the matter and the failure to give such notice
might impair the individual's legal rights. Id.
99. ABA, Revised Standards 2004, supra note 1, 1 C.
100. ABA, Standards2001, supranote 2, § F.
101. Id.
102. ABA, Revised Standards2004, supra note 1, F; ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § F.
103. ABA, Revised Standards 2004, supra note 1, T F(2)(a)(i); ABA, Report 2004, supra note 1, § F.
104. ABA, Revised Standards2004, supra note 1, T F(l)(c) (emphasis added).
105. ABA, Report 2004, supranote 1, § F.
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process that may well address the person's concern effectively, but [that] doing so
may not protect that person's legal right" or the rights of the entity for which the
ombuds functions. 0 6 The 2001 Standards acknowledges that because "important
legal rights and liabilities" may be affected by the resolution of the notice issue,
an ombuds should, in appropriate circumstances, advise an individual that her
communication may not constitute notice to the entity.10 7 The new Standards
provide the same instruction to ombuds, although rather than limiting its use to
"appropriate circumstances," the new Standards obligate the ombuds to provide
this information in a "general and publicly available manner" to all individuals
who contact the ombuds.'0 8 It is apparent from the reasoning provided in the 2004
Report that the new Standards recognize and place value on the idea that confidentiality in the ombuds process is best protected by not imputing notice to the
ombuds of the establishing entity.' ° 9 By focusing on the necessity of independence and confidentiality in the ombuds process, the writers of the new Standards
set forth a necessary modification of the 2001 Standards, which clearly defines the
scope of confidentiality to be utilized in the ombuds process, and sets the outer
limits to which that confidentiality may be extended.110
B. FutureImplications of the New Notice Provisionin the Employment
Context
Although the new notice provision clarifies the boundaries to which confidentiality is extended, it may also raise certain issues in the employment context. The
employment setting by its very nature often brings about situations in which an
employee suffers adverse consequences as a result of making complaints about
her employer within the workplace. Thus, the outer boundaries to which confidentiality may be stretched are of great significance. In a society that continues to
place importance on the rights of employees to make complaints in a way that
ensures those complaints will be addressed, it is likely that conflicts in the employment context may arise.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002111 was signed into law by President George
W. Bush on July 30, 2002.112 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes guidelines that
public companies possessing specific criteria' 3 must follow in their corporate
operations. 1 4 Created in response to actions of corporate authorities that have

106. id. The ombuds role is set out explicitly in the negative, specifying that "the ombuds is not the
person's lawyer or labor representative nor a human resources or social work counselor" for either the
complainant or the entity. Id.
107. ABA, Standards 2001, supra note 2, § F.
108. Id.
109. See ABA, Report 2004,supra note 1.
110. See id.
111. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
112. Id.
113. Sarbanes-Oxley applies to companies with a class of securities under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and to companies that are required to file reports under section 15(d) of the
same act, or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 780(d), 781 (2004).
114. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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"shaken confidence in our markets,"' 1 5 Sarbanes-Oxley provides rules that companies must follow within their scheme of corporate governance "to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures made pur116
suant to the securities laws, and for other purposes."
Included within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are provisions enabling employees of
publicly traded companies to report to their employer information regarding
unlawful acts or violations occurring in the workplace." 7 For example, Title VII
of Sarbanes-Oxley-named "Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability"' 18_
provides "whistle blower protection" to employees of publicly traded companies
who lawfully provide information or otherwise participate in any proceeding regarding the employer's alleged violation." 9 Title VII states that the employer, as
well as any individual working for the employer, may not discriminate in any way
against an employee who lawfully provides such information. 120 Also, section
301 states that each "audit committee"' 2' in order to be in compliance must establish procedures for the confidential, anonymous submission by company 22employees of concerns "regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.",
Although companies may choose from a wide range of alternatives, many
choose the establishment of an ombuds position as its established reporting procedure. 123 As was predicted (and still is), the choice of many companies to establish
an ombuds office has prompted the growth of ombuds in the corporate world. 24
In effect, the ombudsman is established to serve as a "safe haven" 125 to which
employees may report company violations without fear of suffering adverse employment consequences. The confidentiality aspect of the ombuds encourages
employees to file complaints internally, giving companies an opportunity to cor115. President George W. Bush, Statements at Signing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30,
2002). The president's statements are published at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/
20020730.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
116. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). See also President
George W. Bush, Statements at Signing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30, 2002). The president
stated, 'This law gives my administration new tools for enforcement. We will use them to the fullest.
We will continue to investigate arrest and prosecute corporate officials who break the law." Id.
117. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A, 1348. This includes alleged violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or
1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal
law relating to fraud against shareholders. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (2002). See Summary of Sarbanes-Oxley, TRIANGLE Bus. J., Dec. 6, 2002, at http://www.biz
joumals.com/triangle/stories/2002/12/09/focusl .html.
118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit. 7, 116 Stat. 745.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2004).
120. Id. This includes "any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company."
Id. The employer or individual may not "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass," or in any other
way discriminate against the employee. Id.
121. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit. 3, § 301.
122. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Sarbanes-Oxley Opens Doors, AICPA
ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2005, at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/tpcpa/oct2003/sarbanes.htm.
123. Id. Such reporting systems range from providing a telephone hot line to establishing the position
of an ombudsman. Id.
124. Carolyn Hirschman, Someone To Listen: Ombuds Can Offer Employees a Confidential,Discreet
Way To Handle Problems-But Setup and Communication are Crucial To Making This Role Work
Properly-Employee Relations, Society for Human Resource Management & Gale Group (2003), at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m3495/is-1 48/ai_96453596/print.
125. Email from Richard Reuben, Professor of Alternative Dispute Resolution, University of Missouri School of Law, to Katherine Welch, Student Author, University of Missouri-Columbia, School of
Law (Oct. 7, 2004, 10:35 PM CST) (on file with author).
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rect problems before they become "public relations nightmares."' 126 This is an
important feature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because it does not require employees to file a complaint in-house before contacting an outside enforcement
agency.127
Although a seemingly good solution, it is also possible that the establishment
of an ombuds may conflict with the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because, if
operated under the new Standards, the establishing company's ombuds would
have no obligation to pass along reported information.12 Because one aim of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to take action upon hearing information regarding fraudulent actions within the public company, this policy would seem to frustrate the
reporting requirement. 29 One possible solution might be to create an exception
for reports made to an ombuds pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.' 30 However,
creating any sort of exception would likely undermine the qualities of independence and confidentiality upon which the ombuds process must be based.1 3'
When viewed in this way, the new notice provision somewhat conflicts with
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's overall purpose and presents the potential for notice
issues to arise in future employment disputes brought in accordance with Sarbanes-Oxley. On the other hand, drafters of the new Standards argue that an ombuds should not be used to fill the mandatory reporting requirement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the first place. 132 The reasons given are that "[w]hen presented with a serious issue that appears to have merit, an ombuds will more than
likely exercise the inherent discretion of the office by reporting or helping others
report the substance of the matter to management while maintaining confidentiality.' 133 However, the ombuds office, through the use of its discretion, "might
' 34
decide for one reason or another that the matter should not be brought forward."'
Uncertainty as to whether the "ombuds will be a conduit from a whisteblower to
senior manager" is the result. 35 Because this uncertain result is intolerable, "the
to supplement, but not replace, a [Sarombuds should therefore be established
136
banes-Oxley] reporting mechanism."'
Minor exceptions aside, the new notice provision is likely to be very effective
in the employment dispute resolution context. Further, the benefits of the provision will likely extend to both sides of the dispute. By establishing an ombuds
office, an employer may help to facilitate the resolution of employee complaints
more quickly and effectively and may also reduce the potential for future disputes.
Absent the protection of such communications to an ombuds, many employers
might be hesitant to establish an ombuds office for fear that doing so will create a
heightened risk of liability for any employer inaction in responding to employee
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Sharan Levine & Paula Aylward, Integrity Meets Integrity: Using Ombuds To Comply With
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 11 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 13, 13-14 (2005).
133. Id. at 14.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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claims. As previously discussed, employer-employee disputes have resulted in a
judicial finding that the employer had constructive notice of the harassment or
other discriminatory act alleged by the employee. By eliminating the possibility
that notice provided to the employer's ombuds may be imputed to the employer,
the new notice provision will encourage employers to establish an ombuds office,
which will in turn afford employers the benefits of a more efficient dispute resolution system, without the fears of adverse consequences.
The new notice provision will also be extremely beneficial to employees.
Key to the effectiveness of the notice provision is the recognition of the role of
confidentiality in the ombuds process. Without assuring that employee complaints will be kept confidential, the ombuds process would be less attractive to
employees who would otherwise seek its aid. Furthermore, if employees become
less candid when speaking with an ombuds out of fear that any admission might
be used against them in a subsequent legal action, the power of the office to solve
problems will diminish. 137 Courts have a special interest in protecting an ombuds
office's problem-solving function. There are also strong public policy arguments
in favor of facilitating the compromise and settlement of disputes outside of court
so as to avoid wasting time in litigation when38 a problem can be solved through
other, more efficient or more effective means.1
IV. CONCLUSION
The notice provision contained in the 2004 Standards is key to protecting the
role of confidentiality in the ombuds process. By establishing that a complainant's communications will be kept confidential, employees will be more likely to
seek the aid of an ombuds before resorting to judicial resolution of their issues.
This is important because the use of an ombuds to resolve employment problems
is often a more effective and efficient dispute resolution process than a judicial
proceeding brought to address the same issue. Further, the benefits of the notice
provision will extend to both employers and employees as companies continue to
establish ombuds offices. Because employees will be more likely to report grievances to an ombuds when they are assured of the ombuds' confidentiality, and
because employers will be more willing to establish ombuds offices without fear
of adverse consequences resulting from employer inaction, the entire dispute resolution process within the workplace will likely become more efficient through the
use of ombuds. Although the possibility exists for conflicting interests between
ombuds offices and various reporting schemes intended to provide the maximum
disclosure possible, the new notice provision will absolutely provide more help
than harm to achieving the Standards' objective of a more efficient and effective
resolution of disputes within the workplace.
KATHERINE A. WELCH

137. See Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90 (D. Iowa 1987) (expressing concern about state officials
"becom[ing] less candid when contacted by an ombudsman out of fear that any admission might be
used against them in a subsequent legal action" and that this will adversely affect the power of the
ombuds office to act as a problem solver).
138. Id.
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